To interpret Marx or objectively “reproduce the concrete through thought” by means of the historically specific methodological course opened by Marx

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Buenos Aires, November 2025

Abstract

Marxism is universally based on interpreting Marx's writings in a positive light. However, interpretations are inherently lacking in objectivity. Therefore, Marxism is riddled with an objectively irresolvable debate between "true" and "false" Marxism. Conversely, the political action of the working class, aimed at overcoming the capitalist mode of production by creating a society of freely associated individuals in which objective consciousness constitutes the general social relation, must transcend mere interpretation. This necessity concerns the historical specificity of the scientific method capable of organizing such action. The logical representation of concrete forms—that is, conceptual interpretations—is the proper form of scientific consciousness alienated under capital. While capital requires objective knowledge to technically organize production, it cannot objectively confront its own determinants. Based on this analysis, this article focuses on elaborating Marx's "reproduction of the concrete through thought" as the historically appropriate scientific method of the working class as a revolutionary subject.

1. Introduction

The development of society's material productive forces takes shape through the determination of the working class as a revolutionary subject. In turn, this revolutionary subjectivity takes its own form in the production of the working class's political consciousness. This political consciousness carries within it a historical specificity: that of organizing action aimed at overcoming the capitalist mode of production.

Capital is a general, objectified social relation that autonomously governs human life. It does so by confronting its producers as an alien power that determines them as its personifications, whose personal freedom is the bearer of their alienation. Therefore, abolishing capitalism means transforming its objectified automatism, which is realized through alienated consciousness, into its opposite: a general social relation embodied directly in the universality of an individual consciousness that objectively knows its determination as an organ of the social metabolism, thus emancipating personal freedom from all alienation. The knowledge in question must be objective, not only in its content; its

very form must preserve and account for this objectivity. In other words, its method must reproduce the objectivity of its content through thought.

Throughout its history, Marxism has become, and remains today, the universally dominant expression of the political consciousness that, recognizing itself as inherent to the working class, struggles to overcome capitalism. Generally speaking, as its name suggests, Marxism bases its logical representation of real-world conditions on its positive, however critical, interpretation of Marx's writings. To avoid misunderstandings, it should be noted that the term "positive" (for lack of a better word) is used here not in the sense of "positivism," but rather in the sense of "approving," since every Marxist interpretation conceives of itself as corresponding, directly or indirectly, in some way, to what Marx thought. Furthermore, "positive" stands in contrast to "negative" interpretations that attempt to discredit and dismiss Marx's works.

The question immediately arises: Is the methodological basis of Marxism capable of providing the political consciousness of the working class with the necessary objectivity to organize its revolutionary action as the bearer of the overcoming of capitalism?

The article begins by developing three contradictions inherent in Marxism's general method of knowledge as a hermeneutically sustained logical representation of real determinations, in relation to the question posed. The first of these contradictions arises between the necessity for fully objective knowledge and the mediation of subjective viewpoints in its production, since this mediation is inherent to interpretation. The section "*On the Interpretive Character of Marxism, or on the Objectively Irresolvable Dichotomy Between 'True' and 'False' Marxism"* addresses this issue.

In general, Marxism conceives of an external relationship between, on the one hand, knowledge in the form of theory and, on the other, practice as action itself. However, for action to be truly organized by objective knowledge, this knowledge must itself recognize itself in the unity of its determinations. This unity arises from the fact that knowledge is the moment in which action organizes and governs itself. This is the second contradiction in question, developed in the section "*Knowledge is the organizing instance of action, or to know is to organize one's own action.*"

The third contradiction between the methodological approach of Marxism and the necessity for an objectively conscious knowledge of its own determinations in the process of overcoming capitalism arises from its form as a logical representation of reality.

Logical representations, whether formal or dialectical, begin by abstracting real concrete forms into mutually independent concepts, ideally emptied of any necessity that would allow them to move on their own[1]. They then relate these concepts, either by identity or opposition, according to their logically established external constructive coherence. Given this twofold externality, logical representations can ideally represent and even reconstruct real

[1]It goes without saying that the terms "ideal" and "ideally" are used throughout this text exclusively in the sense of "through ideas" or "by/in/through thought".

existences. But they cannot ideally reproduce these same real existences. Therefore, logical representations cannot account for their own objectivity beyond the formality of their constructive coherence. Within them, purely subjective concepts in the form of ideological presuppositions are indistinguishable from objective ones, provided they satisfy logical formality.

Marxism adheres to the method of logical representation to the point of self-contradiction. It agrees with the historically specific character of all social relations. Now, logical representation is a form of consciousness through which human subjects organize their lives as bearers of their social relations; therefore, it is itself a historically specific social relation. However, Marxism conceives of logical representation as if it were the definitive, henceforth ahistorical, form of the scientific method.

The third contradiction and its consequences are developed in the section "*The scientific method of logical representation as a historically specific social relation, or free scientific consciousness as a form of alienated consciousness in capital*."

After discovering the dual nature of the logical representation that explains its historical specificity, our initial question gives rise to a new one: What form does the scientific method need to take in order to become the consciousness that carries within itself the historical necessity of capital to overcome itself through the political action of the working class?

This method must be capable of producing a consciousness objectively able to recognize its own real determinations, free from the appearances that arise from a constructive necessity imposed externally upon reality. It cannot resort to any ideal representation or reconstruction of concrete real forms. Therefore, the only path open to it is to advance by ideally reproducing the course followed by the actual determination of these concrete real forms.

In fact, Marx confronts us with this path that advances dialectically toward the "reproduction of the concrete through thought."[2] But it is certainly not a matter of interpreting Marx's statement in this or that way. It is a matter of developing for ourselves the reproduction in thought of the concrete reality that our action seeks to transform. This means both taking into account what we recognize in our object as a determination whose knowledge has already been produced by Marx, and subjecting both his production and our own to critique.

The section "*The reproduction of the concrete through thought, or dialectical knowledge as a historically specific form of the objective consciousness of the working class as a revolutionary subject*" develops this issue.

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[2]Marx, Karl [1857-58] 1972, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (draft) 1857-1858, Vol. 1, Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, p. 21.

2. On the interpretive nature of Marxism, or on the objectively irresolvable dichotomy between “true” and “false” Marxism

> What opposition party hasn't been labeled communist by its adversaries in power? What opposition party, in turn, hasn't hurled the scathing epithet of communist at both its most progressive representatives and its reactionary enemies?[3]

Nothing suggests that, when writing the above, its authors imagined that, in the course of history, the term "Marxist" might come to replace "Communist" in this mutually condemnatory usage between the governing and opposition parties. Moreover, such a condemnation is met with an immediate response from the accused party. "Marxist!" accuses one; "No, Keynesian!" comes the reply. "Marxist!" retorts the accused party as soon as it discovers that some leading figure of the opposition is hiding a communist skeleton in the closet of their youth; "No, not being a socialist at twenty proves you have no heart; being one at thirty proves you have no brain!" justifies the other, plagiarizing Clemenceau.

However entertaining this tragicomic exchange of accusations, where the prevailing question is "who, me?", may be, the truly interesting discussion from the perspective of working-class political action is a seemingly inverse one. In this discussion, everyone claims to be a Marxist while, commonly, accusing those who, also claiming to be Marxists, interpret the issue at hand differently of being "false Marxists." The question then becomes unavoidable: what is meant by being a Marxist among those who identify as Marxists?

It is common practice in this field to preface any original work with the phrase "according to Marx's theory..." with certainty, and to expel from the "kingdom of Marxism" anyone who does not subscribe to such a theory. Even Pius IX might have envied such expressions of dogmatic infallibility. But, unlike in his case, there has been no conciliar agreement among Marxists to anoint one of their own as Pope. The Marxist world is not one made in the image and likeness of that in which commodities have anointed one of their own as the expression of their value. It is, so to speak, a world of plain and simple commodities. Thus, the dogmatic authority of one Marxist can be challenged by that of all others. Well, at least outside the various partisan and academic ranks.

In the absence of an authority that can consecrate “true” Marxism with universal scope, the debate about who can legitimately define themselves as a Marxist, and who cannot, is constantly renewed without finding an objective resolution. Consequently, the question becomes repetitive: “What, in fact, is the minimum consensus on what can properly be called a legitimate Marxist interpretation…?”[4]

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[3]Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich [1848] 1973, “Manifesto of the Communist Party”, Marx/Engels Selected Works, Volume 4, Buenos Aires: Editorial Ciencias del Hombre, p. 93.

[4]Tosel, André 2008, 'The Development of Marxism : From the End of Marxism-Leninism to a Thousand Marxisms – France-Italy, 1975–2005,' in Jacques Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis (eds.), Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism , Leiden: Brill, p. 44, my translation.

Recently, Professor Astarita proposed what he considers an insurmountable criterion for making classificatory distinctions.[5] According to him, this criterion is based on "the dialectical idea of the 'leap from quantity to quality.'" He thus differentiates, as mere "quantitative alterations," "a space of nuances, dissonances, and critiques of aspects of the theory, which nevertheless remain within a matrix of thought that forms a theoretical and political corpus with a characteristic physiognomy." Beyond these quantitative alterations, "there are questions that represent a qualitative rupture." Astarita offers as a concrete example that, "given that the theory of exploitation constitutes one of the defining features of Marxism, if someone maintains that the capitalist mode of production is not exploitative, they could not, in any way, fit within the current of Marxist thought."

According to this criterion, it seems clear that anyone who claims that "[t] he legitimate income, whether derived from labor or not, should be protected,"[6] that is, who considers income derived from the exploitation of others' labor legitimate, cannot possibly fit within the Marxist camp. However, this assertion constitutes a principle of "Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory," upon which those who base their practice according to "the important thought of the 'Three Represents'" base their beliefs.[7] And, since "the leap from quantity to quality" has been invoked, should we exclude from Marxism those who possibly constitute the largest group of those who define themselves as Marxists worldwide?

Let us consider another case. Guided by the stated criterion, the conception that "capitalism is negatively affected by unnecessary alienation and exploitation," the need to overcome which "flows from a historical conception of the world, based on the evolution of forms of property,"[8] would seem not to exceed the scope of a "quantitative alteration." But if adherence to the "theory of value" is set as the limit for a "qualitative break," then "analytical Marxism" should fall outside this category, since it advocates abandoning this theory, considering that to analyze exchange relations, "the tools for "Excellence lies in rational choice models: general equilibrium theory, game theory, and the arsenal of modeling techniques developed by neoclassical economics."[9] However, to date, no Marxist within the quantitative adequacy school has succeeded in having analytical Marxism cease to be considered a variant of Marxism.

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[5]Astarita, Rolando 2013, "Kicillof ¿el ministro marxista?", in http://rolandoastarita.wordpress.com/2013/11/20/kicillof-el-ministro-marxista/ , p. 1.

[6] Jiang Zemin 2002, "Full text of Jiang Zemin 's report to the XVI Congress of the CPC", Beijing, at http://spanish.china.org.cn/spanish/50593.htm .

[7] Jiang Zemin 2002, op . cit.

[8]Roemer, John 1986, "' Rational choice ' Marxism : some issues or method and substance ", en John Roemer, (editor), Analytical Marxism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press - Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme , pp. 194 and 201 (my translation).

[9]Roemer, John, op . cit., p. 192.

However, a stricter criterion could also be adopted regarding the " every man for himself" approach,[10] considering that a " simultaneous dual-system interpretation " of the derivation of production prices from values rejects Marx's theory of exploitation, as opposed to a "single-system temporal interpretation."[11] Or, on which side of the quantitative delimitation should the attempt to associate the historical specificity of commodity fetishism with the "fetish" about which "psychoanalysis reveals its biological significance" fall?[12] And how to define whether the critique of the theory of the falling rate of profit, characteristic of the Neue Marx-Lektüre, corresponds to a "quantitative alteration" or crosses the "qualitative breaking point" of Marxism?[13] Or whether the new category of "Marxism without Marx"[14] fits within Marxism? Or whether only those who propose "returning to Marx" to "combat 'religious Marxism'" are worthy of the name?[15] (which would presuppose that to be a true Marxist one would first have to have gone somewhere else from which to return) Or, if after all, even modern emulators of Proudhon can feel welcomed by the "now we are all Marxists"?[16] In short, how to establish on which side of the line drawn for "the leap from quantity to quality" would fall an "erratic Marxist,"[17] a Marxist for the "long term" and a Keynesian for the "here and now,"[18] or the very assertion that "taking 'liberties' in the name of Marx simply means entering the freedom of Marxism"?[19]

For his part, even Marx himself has been declared unworthy of being claimed by Marxism insofar as he is accused of cultivating "the ideological, not scientific, character of the concept of 'alienated labor' and, consequently, of the concept of 'alienation' that underpins it,"[20] which even leaves a "flagrant and extremely damaging influence [...]: the theory of fetishism."[21] Nor is there any shortage of Marxists who accuse Marx of undermining the correct interpretation of his own theory by including in the first chapter of Capital "a few sentences" in which he

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[10]Kliman, Andrew 2007, Reclaiming Marx's "Capital", Lanham: Lexington Books, p. 8, my translation"

[11]Kliman, Andrew 2007, op . cit., pp. 5, 189, my translation.

[12]Lacan, Jacques [1966] 2000, " Responses to students in philosophy ", in Others Écrits , Paris: Seuil, pp. 207-208, my translation.

[13] Heinrich, Michael 2013, "Crisis Theory, the Law of the Tendency of the Profit Rate to Fall, and Marx's Studies in the 1870s", Monthly Review, Vol. 64, N° 11, April.

[14]Freeman, Alan 2010, " Marxism Without Marx: A note towards a critique," Capital and Class, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 84–97.

[15] Harnecker , Marta 1967, "Introduction", in Louis Althusser, The Theoretical Revolution of Marx, Mexico: Siglo XXI, p. 3.

[16]Bax, Ernest Belfort 1893, "The Zurich Resolutions ", Justice, 13th May, p. 6 (my translation).

[17] Varoufakis, Yanis 2013, "Confessions of an Erratic Marxist in the Midst of a Repugnant European Crisis", en https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2013/05/14/confessions-of-an-erratic-marxist keynote-speech-subversive-festival-zagreb-croatia-14th-may-2013/

[18] Lapavitsas , Costas 2015, "Interview by S. Budgen ", https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/03/lapavitsas-varoufakis-grexit-syriza/ , 12/3

[19]Anderson, Perry 1986, Transitions from Antiquity to Feudalism, Mexico City, Siglo XXI Editores, p. 3.

[20]Althusser, Louis 1972, "On theoretical work", in Louis Althusser, Philosophy as a weapon of revolution, Córdoba: Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente, No. 4, pp. 95-96.

[21]Althusser, Louis 1992, "Guide to reading 'Capital'", preface to the French edition of Volume I, dialectéktica . Journal of philosophy and social theory, year I, number 2, October, p. 25.

explicitly states the physiological materiality of abstract labor—therefore, a condition common to all forms of society, which is only socially represented as value when materialized in a product useful to others privately and independently—something that "cannot in any way be compatible with the entirety of Marx's theory of value."[22] And, based on this accusation, Marx is charged with insisting on popularizing the exposition of the form of value, thus obscuring his "labor theory of value" to the point of rendering it an "unfinished version."[23] But there are also those who indignantly blame Marx for the generosity with which anyone can define themselves as a Marxist: "We are all Marxists in a Marxist world."[24]

The criterion supposedly based on "the dialectical idea of the 'leap from quantity to quality'" is powerless to establish a definition of Marxism that transcends the subjective arbitrariness of "I, the true Marxist; you, the false Marxist." And this is hardly surprising. The difficulty of any classification lies in explaining the nature of the qualitative difference that manifests itself in a quantitative difference, not in blindly proceeding in reverse, starting from the observation of a supposed quantitative difference and from there inferring the existence of a qualitative difference whose content remains unexplained. This inverted approach, which begins with the indefiniteness of quality, cannot overcome the barrier of the difference's smallness.[25] In this case, the barrier of sectarian arguments about who is included and who is not.

Since the starting point of any classification lies in recognizing the qualitative attribute that defines its object, the problem lies in identifying what quality characterizes a Marxist. And the distinctive qualitative attribute that Marxists share is that they all identify themselves as individuals who seek to interpret Marx's writings, and his political action in general, in the positive way that each one deems appropriate . Nothing illustrates the quality of positively interpreting Marx's texts as the generic attribute that defines Marxism better than the specific, opposing conclusions that Marxist theorists reach about the meaning of the very original text they are explicitly interpreting, on which they base their own arguments. However, Marxist interpretations do not pursue mere scholarly interest. On the contrary, they aim to apply themselves to the real world in order to interpret its movements in a way that allows for changing the existing social organization into one superior from the perspective of the realization of the generic human being.

In short, *the defining qualitative attribute of Marxists is that each one recognizes themselves as a political subject who sets out to interpret the world in order to change it, interpreting Marx in the positive way they deem appropriate* . And this qualitative attribute

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[22] Rubin , Isaak [1927] 1974, Essays on the Marxist theory of value, Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente, 53, Buenos Aires, p. 188.

[23]Backhaus, Hans-Georg 1980, 'On the dialectics of the value-form ', Thesis Eleven, 1, February , p. 100, my translation.

[24] Felix , David 1983, Marx as Politician , Carbondale & Edwardsville : Southern Illinois University Press, p. 218, my translation.

[25]Hegel, GWF [1812] 1976, Science of Logic, Buenos Aires: Ediciones Solar, p. 436.

remains unchanged no matter how much they claim to practice a Marxian interpretation, whose interpretive scope is declared to be opposed to any Marxist interpretation, under the guise of equating "Marxian" with "Marx's own."[26]

The question of the qualitative nature of Marxism thus confronts us with the question of the qualitative nature of interpretation. Every interpretation is an act in which the subject defines which of the attributes that their own determined subjectivity leads them to find in the object are relevant in determining the object's objectivity itself and, consequently, its potentialities. On this basis, the subject again confronts the object as if it were presenting as a real necessity what their own subjectivity has ideally introduced into it; that is, the subject represents the object as bearing this subjectively constructed necessity. Whether it is the interpretation of a musical score, religious scriptures, or, as is relevant here, Marx's scientific texts, such is the subjectively determined essence of interpretation.

At the risk of being redundant, the question here is not whether one Marxist interpretation is more or less reasonable than another, whether it refers to this or that issue, whether it corresponds to this or that text by Marx, or whether it concerns a stage or the entirety of Marx's life. The question is the very root of Marxism in interpretation itself, whatever its particular line of thought.

Given the interpretive nature of Marxism—that is, given that Marxists recognize themselves as interpreters of Marx—the fact that they interpret Marx in different ways sets them against each other as different species belonging to the same genus. The possibility of "each person their own Marxist" is inherent to the very interpretive essence of Marxism. And from this very essence stems the impossibility of finding an objective criterion capable of defining a classification between "true" and "false" Marxists. *The attempt to establish such an objective criterion constitutes a contradiction in terms with the interpretive essence of Marxism* . Of course, the discovery of this fact does not in itself have the power to put an end to the mutual accusations of "false Marxist." On the contrary, its power lies in explaining why such accusations have been, and will continue to be, part of Marxist subjectivity.

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[26]"[T]he Marxist theory of value necessarily blocked the understanding of the Marxian theory of value." The interpretative opposition between Marxist and Marxian is so widespread that the statement by Backhaus, Hans-Georg 1997, Dialektik der Wertform, Freiburg, Caira Verlag , p. 69, is cited in this way in the translation of the text by Elbe, Ingo, Marx im Westen 1997, Berlin : Akademie Verlag , http://enelhorizontedelacrisis.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/ingo-elbe_entre-marx-el-marxismo-y los-marxismos.pdf , even though the original uses the term Marxschen , that is, strictly speaking, "of Marx".

3. Knowledge is the organizing principle of action, or to know is to organize one's own action

Engels's recollections of Marx's self-referential remarks are well known: "...Marx once said to Lafargue: 'The truth is, I am not a Marxist.'"[27] And also: "As Marx said of the French 'Marxists' of the late 1770s: 'All I know is that I am not a Marxist.'"[28]

If one were to interpret Marx, one might conclude that his self-exclusion from Marxism stems solely from a formal impossibility: just as Marxism interprets Marx, it is meaningless to say that Marx interprets himself. Alternatively, it could be understood as an expression through which Marx "meant that he considered what he had done as merely the beginning of a science, and not as finished knowledge." [29]Or as a "painful lament" in rejection of the doctrinaire conceptions of Lafargue and his colleagues. [30]Or as an attempt to "undo" the constitution of the "aberrant mythology" that "bears from its origin the stigma of obscurantism," concerning the "'founders' of a set of ideological and political conceptions artificially grouped under the name of 'Marxism'."[31]

We can continue indefinitely speculating about how to interpret Marx's explicit denial of being a Marxist. But let's ask ourselves what the interpretive nature of Marxism truly confronts us with in the exercise of our own condition as political subjects who aim to transform the current social order. Immediately, this question brings us face to face with another of Marx's statements that places interpretation itself at the center: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change it* ."[32]

There is a general consensus among Marxists regarding the interpretation of this thesis: the criticism of philosophers lies not in their interpretation of the world, but in their failure to act once they have made that interpretation. According to this view, the point is to interpret the world in order to then act upon it and transform it. However, let us return to the question of what interpretation is. Whatever its particular object, the interpretation of something is a way of knowing the potential that something presents to the subject in order to make it their

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[27]Engels, Friedrich [1882] 1967, "Letter from Engels to E. Bernstein of 2/3 November 1882", Marx-Engels Werke, Band 35, Berlin : Dietz Verlag , p. 388, my translation; the quotation of Marx is in French in the original German

[28]Engels, Friedrich [1890] 1967, "Letter from Engels to C. Schmidt of August 5, 1890," Marx Engels Werke, Volume 37, Berlin : Dietz Verlag , p. 436, my translation; the quotation of Marx is in French in the original German. The same observation is repeated, although Engels quotes Marx in German, in his letter to P. Lafargue of August 27, 1890, ibid ., p. 450.

[29]Althusser, Louis 1972, "Theoretical practice and ideological struggle", in Philosophy as a weapon of revolution, op . cit., p. 39.

[30]Vincent, K. Steven 1992, Between Marxism and Anarchism : Benoît Malon and French Reformist Socialism , Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 74, my translation.

[31]Rubel, Maximilien 1974, "La légende de Marx ou Engels fondateur ", in M. Rubel, Marx critique du marxisme , Paris: Payot , pp. 19-21, my translation.

[32]Marx, Karl [1845] 1978, 11th thesis on Feuerbach, " Thesen über Feuerbach", Marx-Engels Werke, Band 3, Berlin : Dietz Verlag , p.7, my translation.

own. It is a form of knowledge. Therefore, to answer the question of the necessity of interpretation as such, we need to ask ourselves about the necessity of knowledge in general.

In every metabolic process, the subject needs to expend their body to appropriate the objects of their environment, thereby reproducing themselves as a subject through this appropriation. The production of knowledge is the moment in the metabolic process in which the subject consumes their body in order to appropriate the potential they possess as a subject in relation to the potential offered by the object of their environment. That is, knowledge is the process by which the subject virtually appropriates their condition as such, in order to regulate the full expenditure of their body that they must undertake to act upon the object and effectively appropriate it in the process of self-reproduction. Thus, knowledge is the process by which the subject governs their action of effectively appropriating their object to satisfy their own end. As such an expenditure of the body that the subject carries out to govern their action, the process of knowledge is a moment of action itself; it is action in its own movement.

Therefore, the issue is not that philosophers have failed to act after interpreting the world. The issue is that the very form of their knowledge of the world—the act of interpreting it— has been the necessary way to govern their actions, rendering them powerless to change it. The question we face here does not concern the content of the interpretation, but rather the very form of the process of knowledge that results in an interpretation. In other words, the question concerns the method of producing this knowledge.

Conscious knowledge, that is, knowledge that knows itself to be knowledge—or more simply, consciousness—is the form of knowledge generically proper to human beings. Consciousness is the way in which each human subject carries within themselves the capacity to govern their individual actions as an organ of the social metabolic process.

Scientific consciousness, scientific knowledge, is a specifically determined form by which the human subject governs its action upon its object. In this specific form, the subject aims to virtually appropriate its own potentiality in relation to that of the object, without the intervention of its subjectivity in this process of knowledge introducing into the object—ideal or real—determinations that are not inherent to it as such. If the materiality of the knowledge process inevitably affects that of the object, this fact must be included among the determinations that must be objectively known in order to govern the effective appropriation of the object. Consequently, it is a form of knowledge through which the subject aims to ideally apprehend the determinations of its own subjectivity, as if it were an object external to itself. Therefore, its method, that is, its form, has a doubly objective character. Hence its power to transform reality. Since not only the object but also the subject undergo changes as the process of effective appropriation progresses, this double objectivity must be constantly renewed.

This raises the question of why, if scientific knowledge is itself human action in the process of organizing itself in the most powerful way to transform the world, it is conceived in contemporary society as separate from action: on the one hand there is theory, and on the

other there is practice, only to then, at best, state that both must be placed in a correspondingly external relationship whose concrete mode of operation is never defined, but merely called praxis. In fact, this divorce between scientific knowledge and action underlies the Marxist interpretation, which considers the problem of philosophers to be that they know, but then fail to act accordingly.

4. The scientific method of logical representation as a historically specific social relation, or free scientific consciousness as a form of alienated consciousness in capital.[33]

4.1 Alienation in the form of free consciousness

In the capitalist mode of production, consciousness is determined in a historically specific way. The general social relation, that is, social being itself, confronts individuals as an objectified existence, external to their persons. This objectified social relation, the product of social labor performed privately, has the capacity to set this same social labor in motion with the immediate aim of multiplying itself. Such is the generic determination of capital. Therefore, human subjects are free from relations of personal dependence in the organization of their lives because they are subject to the social powers objectified in capital. In short, free consciousness is the form that alienated consciousness takes under capital.[34]

Capital's necessity for scientific knowledge contains a contradiction. To produce relative surplus value, particularly through the machinery system, capital needs to subject production to science. However, insofar as scientific knowledge is simply a specific, concrete form of surplus value production, science must reproduce the alienation of consciousness within capital. While it must be an objective consciousness, it also needs to be a consciousness that confronts itself in a non-objective way, accepting the appearance of being

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[33]From here on, this work is based on the chapter "The dialectical method. Critique of scientific theory", by Iñigo Carrera, Juan 2008, Capital: Historical Reason, Revolutionary Subject and Consciousness, Buenos Aires: Imago Mundi.

[34]In its simplest form, as taken by the private organization of social labor—that is, commodity production—each producer has complete control over their own individual labor. They are therefore free from any personal dependency; they are personally free individuals . At the same time, they lack any control over the social character of their labor. This character confronts them as a materialized social power that the products of their labor exert upon them, as commodities that bear value. The moment they assert themselves as personally free individuals through the private performance of their social labor, their consciousness knows, as a matter of life and death, that whatever concrete form it takes, their labor must produce value. To satisfy their personal needs for use values, they need to act consciously as personifications of their commodities. Value is not a personal attribute of theirs, but belongs to the commodities; it is an alienated social attribute of their producers. As personifications, their consciousness must obey an external power; it is determined as an alienated consciousness. Personal freedom is not a natural condition, but a historically specific one. By alienating their consciousness to produce commodities, commodity producers free their consciousness from all personal dependence. Their free consciousness is the form their alienated consciousness takes. See Iñigo Carrera, Juan 2007, Understanding Capital Today: Critically Using "Capital", Buenos Aires: Imago Mundi, pp. 55-62.

an abstractly free consciousness. Therefore, it is a science that needs to present the foundation of its objectivity as arising from outside itself, from a philosophical representation that conceives itself as the product of a purely abstractly free subjectivity.

Logical representation is this contradiction resolved or, strictly speaking, developed. Let us briefly consider the issue from its inception.

4.2. Logic as the path to represent/reconstruct real determinations in thought

A logic is a structure of ideal necessity whose constructive coherence allows it to objectively represent the relationships between real forms through thought. Resorting to a logical necessity immediately implies abstracting from the presence of any necessity inherent in the real existence that is the object of the process of knowledge. That is, any logical representation assumes, explicitly or implicitly, that the real forms that are its object lack the capacity to move on their own. Otherwise, the flow of the logical construction could diverge from the movement of the real object it attempts to represent ideally, thus revealing its abstract nature. Moreover, if real existences were considered capable of developing on their own, why not follow that development with our thought in order to virtually appropriate it without any mediation?

To satisfy this foundational abstraction, logical knowledge represents real connections by taking the forms in which real determining necessities appear as a necessity already realized, as if they did not simultaneously carry within themselves their own necessity to be realized. On this basis, real existences are defined as incapable of moving on their own. Thus, nothing in the real world is conceived as capable of carrying within itself the necessity for its own transcendence. It seems that all movement must be imposed upon them externally, even when it comes to living subjects. Thus posited as incapable of moving on their own, all real forms are represented by thought as if they were abstract immediate statements. Hence, free consciousness can only be free consciousness. In turn, alienated consciousness can be nothing other than itself. But there is no way that free consciousness can be the necessary concrete form of alienated consciousness. At most, the two can be put together, contradicting each other externally, although each remains an abstract immediate statement.

Once real existences have been ideally stripped of their necessity—that is, transformed into concepts or logical categories—the representation of their movement must impose upon them a constructive necessity that relates them externally in thought, in order to construct a conceptual system. However, as a means to scientific knowledge, the relationships that result from this constructive necessity must objectively correspond to the external manifestation of the relationships between the real forms they are intended to represent.

Focusing directly on their construction, logical relations base their objective rational coherence on the principle of identity. According to this principle, nothing can transcend

itself by itself. Otherwise, the flow of logical construction could diverge from the movement of the real object, which it attempts to ideally appropriate by representing it in thought.

Formal logic takes the principle of identity as its immediate and absolute basis.

Dialectical materialist logic takes the same principle as its starting point for formulating concepts. The "law of abstract identity" acts by forming the concept as a "simple unity," upon which the "law of concrete identity" simultaneously acts, introducing contradiction and thus determining the concept as the "unity of opposites," each of which maintains its abstract identity with itself.[35]

Systematic Dialectics begins by directly outlining its procedure. One version aims to construct a systematically ordered "logical progression" "from a category of unity to one of difference, and from there to a category of unity in difference." "Contradiction" and "negation" are the "logical operators" for the transition from one category to the next. Thus, "this progression forms a content that is 'objectively and intrinsically determined,'" which has "reconstructed the internal logic" of real existence. [36]However, despite the declared objectivity, simply continuing to follow its justification reveals its subordination to subjective arbitrariness. The assertion that "categorical theories of this type are by no means free from value judgments" implies [37]the theorist's subjective choice of which transition is to be defined as objective. Similarly, stating that "convincing reasons must be provided to explain" [38]the transition between categories extends the intervention of subjectivity beyond that of the author to include that of those who must be convinced. Systematic dialectics maintains that "the postulation and overcoming of dialectical contradictions is the driving force of this movement" [39]of categories in their progression. If logical categories could objectively carry within themselves an immanent, latent quality that has now emerged and manifested itself—meaning they could postulate and overcome themselves—the subjectivity of the theorist would not enter the picture. Therefore, systematic dialectical logic would produce theories free from value judgments.

Smith observes that Hegel forces the "notion" of an abstract "will" into his dialectic to justify the idealist progression "from abstract law, through morality, to ethical life." [40]Similarly, in systematic dialectics, the theorist's will interprets which real existence should be ideally represented by a category of unity, difference, or unity in difference. This is the same process that classical dialectical materialist logic would explain as progressing from the representation of real existence as a simple conceptual unity based on the law of abstract

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[35] Joja , Athanase 1969, Dialectical Logic and the Sciences, Buenos Aires: Juárez Publisher, pp. 59 and 100-1
[36]Smith, Tony 1990, The Logic of Marx's Capital, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 10-11. 6 and 26, my translation.
[37]Smith, Tony 1990, op . cit., p. 17, my translation.
[38]Smith, Tony 1990, op . cit., p. 46, my translation.
[39]Smith, Tony 1990, op . cit., p. 13, my translation.
[40]Smith, Tony 1990, op . cit., p. 26, my translation.

identity, upon whose definition the law of concrete identity introduces contradiction, thus transforming the concept into a unity of opposites.

A different version of Systematic Dialectical Logic resorts to the principle of identity by following a formally different path. Its conceptual development "depends on the presupposition that there is a whole," each of whose "elements" or "moments," taken in isolation, is "inherently in contradiction with itself" as part of the whole. A "systematic dialectic of categories" then resolves these contradictions, achieving "a reconstruction of reality" as the identity of the whole is "fully understood" through a "system of categories… complete and internally self-sustaining." [41]Now, presupposing a whole implies presupposing its elements and their relations, both to the whole and to each other. Presupposing a whole as a starting point cannot go beyond assuming that this whole and all its elements are immediate, externally related units, in order to avoid falling into the circularity of knowing beforehand what needs to be explained. That is to say, such a presupposition inevitably takes the form of a logical representation based on the principle of identity. Therefore, when one of its elements is considered in isolation, it lacks any capacity to generate a contradiction within itself. Any contradiction must be introduced into it in the same external way that the concept of concrete unity operates in dialectical materialist logic.

Having considered the foundations and procedures of formal and dialectical logic, it is time to focus on their power as ways of organizing human action with scientific and, therefore, objective knowledge.

4.3. The double power of logical representation: ideology in the form of a scientific method

Under the capitalist mode of production, scientific knowledge based on formal logic continually renews and multiplies its power to organize the development of society's productive forces by representing real determinations with objective coherence. As alienated human power within capital, this logical knowledge has radically transformed, time and again, the materiality of labor, thereby radically transforming human subjectivity. It owes this revolutionary power to the fact that its objectivity resides in its own constructive structure, external to the materiality of its real objects.

As we noted earlier, logical necessity must represent the outward manifestation of the objective relations between its objects. And the logical appearance of real forms as abstract, immediate statements effectively corresponds to the formal expression of real quantitative determination when considered in itself. On this basis, logical construction begins by conceiving concrete real forms as devoid of any potential necessity pending realization. From there, it represents the erased necessities through the relations of measurement it establishes between these same real forms. The very quality of the determinations at play

[41]Arthur, Christopher 2004, The new dialectic and Marx's 'Capital', Leiden: Brill, pp. 66-67 and 80, my translation.

remains unknown. However, logical knowledge of the quantitative relations in which these same determinations manifest themselves as realized has the power to operate upon them by objectively controlling the production of quantitative differences that correspond to qualitative changes. Herein lies the power of formal logical representation to transform existing material conditions as a historically specific form of developing the productive forces of society, governed by the production of relative surplus value. You can measure everything objectively without questioning the objective necessity of anything, in particular without questioning the objective necessity that determines the subjectivity of the subject of knowledge.

However, the very method of logical representation does not merely hinder the recognition that the advancement in freedom conferred by this mode of knowledge is the necessary form through which alienation develops itself. Simply by following its own procedure, the method itself openly rejects the possibility of freedom based on objective knowledge. Logical representation begins by conceiving of real concrete forms as abstract, immediate statements. Therefore, logical representation can only appropriate the real necessity that determines them by accounting for the greater or lesser degree of repetition with which these real concrete forms initially appeared. Consequently, logical representation itself arrives at a logically inevitable conclusion. Given its own constructive character, external to the real necessity it attempts to appropriate through thought, it is impossible to attain any certainty about objective knowledge by means of it: theories are logically unverifiable before or after action has been taken.

At the very heart of the epistemological field of formal logic, the recognition began to emerge of the limitations of the externality of logical representation with respect to objective knowledge: "we can never rationally justify our theories." [42]However, having reached this conclusion, the path opened to critical inquiry into the historical determination of the logical method reversed its direction. Since theories are incapable of logically demonstrating their rationality, the question becomes "at least to criticize them rationally" in order to "distinguish what is better from what is worse." [43]From then on, rationality has no source other than the subjectivity of each participant in the debate. Or rather, self-perceived subjectivity must be imposed upon rationality. [44]Thus, objectivity is degraded to a matter of "intersubjective agreement." [45]In this way, subjective interpretations of reality take the place of all possible objective knowledge. Scientific theories are condemned to be different ways of interpreting

[42]Popper, Karl 1978, "The Logic of the Social Sciences", in Popper, Adorno, Dahrendorf and Habermas, The Logic of the Social Sciences, Mexico City: Editorial Grijalbo, p. 27.
[43]Popper, Karl 1978, op . cit., p. 27.
[44]Wolff, Richard and Stephen Resnick 1987, Economics : Marxian versus Neoclassical , Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 256-267, my translation.
[45]Richard Rorty 1996, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth. Philosophical Writings 1. Barcelona: Paidós, p. 41.

reality; They are nothing but ideological constructions founded on "grand narratives of legitimation".[46]

Regardless of their formal or dialectical logic, theories now proudly acknowledge themselves as "not free from value judgments," as in the case considered above. Furthermore, any assertion about the possibility of organizing social life through objective knowledge is condemned as a "totalitarian" attempt against the free subjectivity of others, rendering social life "so predictable that it would lose all its poetry." [47]Thus, ignorance about one's own subjectivity is proclaimed as the path to freedom: "The crisis of the revolutionary subject is its liberation from knowledge." [48]And, in a grotesque escalation, the notion that scientific knowledge cannot avoid being ideologically determined by the very nature of its method gives way to the presentation of "performative activism" as "an alternative to ideology as an approach to social change."[49]

4.4. The scientific method as a historically specific social relationship

As far as the political action of the working class is concerned, these conclusions, which emerge from the very form of logical representation independently of its content, are not an abstract epistemological question. They imply the naturalization of the capitalist mode of production and, therefore, a way of depriving the working class of its status as a revolutionary subject. Any interpretation of a real determination is, in itself, the negation of a knowledge that has transcended all appearances. The interpretation of the determination of one's own social being is the negation of its very objective knowledge. But the full objective knowledge of one's own determination as an individual organ of social life, carried in the consciousness of every member of society, is the necessary form that the general social relation must take in a society founded on the universal conscious organization of this process. Therefore, to assert that objective knowledge is condemned to stop at interpretation is to assert that the general conscious organization of social life is condemned to impossibility. In other words, the assertion that logical representation is the natural, and as such unsurpassable, form of scientific knowledge necessarily implies that the overcoming of the capitalist mode of production by socialism/communism is impossible. This is indeed the case. By its very form, that is, by its method, logical representation is a form of objective consciousness that proclaims "the end of History."

Besides agreeing that the goal is to interpret the world by positively interpreting Marx in order to change it, Marxists unanimously agree that all social relations are historical in

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[46]Lyotard, Jean-François 1987, The Postmodern Condition, Madrid: Cátedra, p. 41.
[47]Durand, Jean 1997, 'Can we make our own history ? : The significance of the dialectic today ,' Capital & Class, Volume 21 Issue 2, p. 146.
[48]Holloway, John 2002, Changing the world without taking power. The meaning of revolution today, Buenos Aires: Revista Herramienta and Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, p. 304.
[49]Friedman, Dan 2021, Performance Activism , Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 276, my translation.

nature. Now, we have already established that consciousness is the way in which each human subject carries within themselves the capacity to govern their own individual actions as an organ of the social metabolic process. Therefore, consciousness is the way in which each person embodies their general social relations. Put simply, consciousness is a form that the general social relations take. But it is not so in an abstract sense, that is, simply by virtue of its content. Its very form—again, its method—is an expression of the general social relations. Therefore, its method is itself a historical social product. However, Marxists agree in considering all social relations as historical, except for the method of scientific knowledge, which they conceive as taking the form of a logical representation by nature and, in this condition, as one or another way of interpreting the world.

So much so that even those who claim that "in matters of Marxism, orthodoxy refers exclusively to the method," [50]and that "the epistemological value of methods turns out to be [...] a historical-social problem," [51]find no more specificity for historical materialism, with respect to the very form of representation, than the abstract invocation of a "mediating totality."[52]

But logical representation is not the natural form of the scientific method. It is a historically determined form of social relation in which ideology, that is, the negation of objective knowledge, asserts itself under the guise of its opposite, the scientific method.

4.5. Artificial intelligence, or the capacity for formal logical reasoning objectified in machinery

> Since calculation is such an external and therefore mechanical matter, machines have been manufactured that perform arithmetic operations with the utmost perfection. Even knowing only this fact about the nature of calculation would already be the basis for deciding what to think about: the idea of making calculation the fundamental means of educating the mind and subjecting it to the torture of perfecting itself by transforming into a machine.[53]

From the capacity to objectify in machinery the absolute externality of numerical relations, the development of the productive forces of labor governed by the production of

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[50]Lukács, Georg [1923] 1969, History and Class Consciousness, Mexico City: Editorial Grijalbo, p. 2

[51]Lukács Georg [1923] 1969, op . cit., p. 181.

[52]Lukács, Georg [1923] 1969, op . cit., p. 182. Hence, Lukács considers that his "writings make no greater claim than to be an interpretation of Marx's doctrine in Marx's sense" (ibid ., p. XLV). On the one hand, he cultivates the appearance that "theory"—that is, the moment when action governs itself by taking the form of a logical representation—can have an existence and an end abstracted from action itself. On the other hand, he reduces action to a "practice" emptied of the concretely determined integrity of its own organization. Then, he places both in a relationship of "coincidence" or not based on their reciprocal exteriority. Only in this way can an action in which the subject realizes his concretely determined social being be represented as if it were governed by a "false consciousness," and not by the necessary concrete form of his consciousness. (ibid ., pp. 234-235).

[53]Hegel, GWF [1812] 1976, op . cit., p. 191.

relative surplus value has advanced to the point of being able to objectify the entire externality of the ideal representation of real determinations based on formal logic. Such is the content of artificial intelligence.

Its logical coherence rests on the premise that the real existences whose concepts it generates lack any necessity to transcend themselves and, therefore, cannot have any content beyond their form. Consequently, no real necessity exists other than that which manifests itself through the repetition of forms. Artificial intelligence takes its starting point from the binary nature of formal logic: something either is or it is not, and there is no logically a third condition. Consciousness is either free or not free, that is, alienated, and there is no third alternative.

But artificial intelligence goes beyond its foundation in formal logic by incorporating multivalued logic: a multiplicity of alternative conditions is incorporated, displacing the excluded middle. Each of these conditions is as independent and distinct from the others as desired, but logical coherence is imposed by the identity of each with itself: fully free consciousness, conditioned consciousness, confused consciousness, false consciousness, etc. For its part, fuzzy logic incorporates the consideration of intermediate values within the original binary alternative, as degrees of truth: for example, 20% free consciousness, 80% not free, that is, alienated, whereby the advance toward human emancipation would pass through the point of inversion of these proportions. Probabilistic logic gives statistical grounding to these same weightings by verifying the degree to which these concepts are empirically repeated: 20% of consciousnesses are free, 80% are alienated. This very opposition between free consciousness and alienated consciousness can even be conceived as inherent to dialectical logic, as the contradictory unity between two mutually exclusive opposites. Finally, quantum logic admits the existence of a superposition between two binary values in the same state, each with its own relative probability. This superposition collapses when an external interaction causes the state to project onto one of the two values. If, merely for illustrative purposes, we were to apply this logical structure to the relationship between free consciousness and alienated consciousness, we could say that both are superimposed in the same state with their corresponding probabilities, until an external intervention forces consciousness to define itself by one of the two alternatives.

Artificial intelligence owes its power to the binary coherence, direct or underlying, of logical representation. Therefore, what it cannot do is unfold the determination of alienated consciousness within capital as the content that affirms itself by taking shape through its own negation. In short, for artificial intelligence, free consciousness can only be free consciousness, alienated consciousness only alienated consciousness, but it is inadmissible for free consciousness to be the necessary form of alienated consciousness and, therefore, to have the latter as its content.

As it advances, the automation of robotic machinery controlled by artificial intelligence is displacing direct human intervention in the operation of machinery in general, tending toward its complete elimination. The corresponding portion of the working class

thus faces the prospect of its transformation into a relative surplus population and the barbarity that capital exerts upon it to liquidate it. But let us focus on the intellectual work performed by the workers who operate in the very production of logical representations. These intellectual workers include those who embody the political organization of the capital accumulation process, which obviously encompasses the political organization of the working class itself, as well as those who develop scientific knowledge of the natural and social human life process or educate others about it.

The speed, scope, and precision with which artificial intelligence processing machinery can perform the analysis process based on the repetition of abstract, immediate statements to which it ideally reduces real forms, and then represent them by placing them in logically coherent relationships, so as to be able to decide with the knowledge inherent in logical representation, absolutely surpasses the speed, scope, and precision of any individual or collective human mind to develop the same process. Just as with workers in general, the productivity of labor dedicated to producing the logical representation itself multiplies explosively with the development of artificial intelligence. But it does so at the expense of the worker's own productive subjectivity. As with any objectification in the machinery of a productive function where the worker's subjectivity directly intervened, the worker is transformed into an appendage of that machinery. Where the worker produced the representation with their own thought, their function becomes feeding the machinery and intervening if its automatism gets out of control. And, as is generally the case, the development of machinery incorporates these tasks into its own automation, displacing the living labor that performed them. In the capitalist mode of production, this leads to the displaced workers becoming a form of relative overpopulation.

Artificial intelligence reveals to us what, in Hegel's time, could barely be applied to the absolute externality of arithmetic relations. The attempt to impose on human thought a method of scientific knowledge for which a machine has greater power due to the mechanical externality of the conceptual relations with which real determinations are represented, under the guise that this method is the naturally necessary way to govern our actions with a free consciousness, constitutes a clear expression of the inverted conception of the powers of human subjectivity as an attribute of the product of its own labor, that is, of alienation in capital.

5. The reproduction of the concrete through thought, or dialectical knowledge as a historically specific form of the objective consciousness of the working class as a revolutionary subject

5.1. From logical representation to the dialectical reproduction of real determinations

Up to this point, we have recognized the specific historical determination of logical representation as the necessary form of objective consciousness in the capitalist mode of

production. It is the necessary form taken by the production of relative surplus value that, as such, denies its subject—and specifically the working class as a political subject—the possibility of objectively knowing itself in its potential as a historical subject. The question immediately arises: what, then, is the form of objective knowledge inherent in the very historical subjectivity of the working class, the bearer of the capacity to organize the overcoming of the capitalist mode of production?

As we noted earlier, logical representation, whether formal or dialectical, begins by confronting concrete real forms as if each one had been determined by a necessity that exhausted its potential once objectified. Thus, logical representation treats concrete real forms as if they possessed no inherent potential to be realized; therefore, as if they were incapable of relating to one another on their own. It then ideally abstracts them into mutually independent concepts. Finally, it places these concepts in the objective, mutual external relation dictated by the coherence of their logical constructive necessity. By following this path, logical knowledge obtains an objective representation of how concrete real forms relate to one another. Indeed, the result is a categorical reconstruction of reality, whose objective constructive coherence reflects that of its logic. However, this constructive coherence is unrelated to the determinations that gave rise to reality itself. In architectural terms, one could say that logical representation ideally reconstructs the concrete, real unity of its object, but it does so only after demolishing this unity by analytically breaking it down into the separate blocks formed by its concepts, and then finally repositioning these blocks within the external relationships designed by its logic. Thus, it allows ideology to seep through the fissures left by this double exteriority. What the logical reconstruction of concrete, real forms prevents itself from doing, from its very first step, is ideally following them along the movement of their relationships in order to reproduce it in thought.

From its very inception, logical knowledge disregards the possibility of ideally following concrete, real-world forms throughout their development in order to reproduce them in thought. Could this method of objective knowledge, in opposition to logical representation, be the historically specific form of consciousness inherent to the working class as a revolutionary subject? To answer this question, let us situate ourselves directly as subjects engaged in the development of its process.

5.2. Dialectical analysis in search of the necessity of concrete forms

To begin with, the reproduction in question does not stop at the appearance that the concrete, real form upon which the action is directed lacks any objective potentiality to be realized. In fact, if this form lacked such potentiality, not only our action, but any action aimed at transforming it would be utterly powerless. Consequently, our process of knowledge must confront this concrete existence through an analysis that recognizes it precisely in its condition of actual existence, which, at the same time, carries within itself a potentiality to be realized. However, in order to act upon this potentiality, our knowledge needs to discover

its necessity. And this necessity resides in the very form of the concrete object we confront as actual existence. In turn, this actual existence is the product of the realization of a potentiality that determined it as such a real existence. That is, our process of analysis must penetrate more deeply into the concrete existence initially confronted, in search of the necessity already realized within it. Therefore, it is now a matter of discovering the form in which the initial concrete still existed as pure potentiality to be realized. To do this, we must analytically confront this newly discovered concrete existence in search of its own determining necessity.

To put it schematically, we are initially faced with concrete existence A, whose potentiality a could be realized by our action. To account for the necessity of this potentiality and, consequently, the necessity of our action, we must answer for the necessity of A as an already realized actual existence. We analyze A and find that it is the concrete form in which concrete existence B realized its potentiality b. Now we must account for the necessity of this potentiality, for which we analyze the necessity of B as an already realized existence and thus arrive at concrete existence C, whose potentiality c was realized, transforming C into its concrete form B.

This schematic presentation shows that dialectical analysis does not consist of the abstraction of recurring attributes, as logical representation does. On the contrary, dialectical analysis progresses by confronting the concrete form in which a necessity has been realized in order to discover the content of this necessity, or, in other words, the necessity for this necessity. Consequently, this form of analysis constantly renews the question of the need of its object, unable to stop until it discovers it in its simplest and most general form of actual existence. That is, until it confronts necessity itself and recognizes it as an actuality whose potential is to realize itself. The simplicity and generality of necessity itself stem from the fact that it carries within itself no other potential than that of self-transcendence, of self-realization, that is, of affirming itself through its own negation. Dialectical analysis thus culminates its course, having reached the point where it is confronting objective existence, that is, matter, in its simplest and most general form. Any attempt to take the analysis beyond this point clashes with the fact that the necessity of the necessity is to realize itself, which makes the analysis return again and again to the same point.

5.3. Dialectical synthesis to ideally reproduce the necessity for concrete forms

Up to this point, our process of knowledge has progressed by inquiring into the objective necessity of content, based on an analysis of its realized form of existence. But, in its culmination, the analytical course has, conversely, placed us before matter as an actual existence that carries within itself a necessity to be realized. Thus, we have no option but to ideally accompany this potential necessity in its realization. And, in this realization, the simplest content develops its necessary concrete form of existence, under which the realized necessity reemerges as a concretely determined potential to be realized. This renews the

need to continue developing our process of synthesis, ideally accompanying this potential in its realization. We thus advance, from the simplest and most general expression of determination, reproducing through our thought the realization of that determination in its necessary concrete forms.

The analytical process inherent in the dialectical reproduction of the concrete through thought differed from that of logical representation in that it proceeded by inquiring into the necessity that determined each concrete form, rather than inquiring into the attributes that were repeated. Correspondingly, the process of synthesis differed by accompanying the development of necessity in its concrete forms, rather than consisting of the elimination of simplifying assumptions.

In their unity, analysis and synthesis form this dialectical process of knowledge. However, it is only through the synthesis phase that the subject effectively appropriates in their thinking the necessity that determines the concrete potential of their action. Marx confronts us with the necessity to recognize this fact for ourselves.

> Indeed, it is far easier to find, through analysis, the earthly core of the nebulous images of religion than to proceed in reverse, starting from the conditions of real life in each era and tracing them back to their divinized forms. This latter method is the only one that can be considered the materialist, and therefore scientific, method.[54]

To clarify this point, let us briefly return to our schematic presentation. At this stage, we already understand the necessity of C as the actual existence of the potential to be realized, c. Therefore, to advance in understanding the necessity of our action, we must accompany the movement of the realization of c in its necessary form, B, and so on. In this way, we finally arrive at the concrete existence of A, but now as an existence whose determination we know objectively, having accompanied the unfolding of its necessity with our thought. Thus, we also understand the necessity of A in its form of potential to be realized, a. We can then recognize which form of our action is, in turn, the concrete form in which potential a is realized in the transformative direction that we, as determined subjects, consciously and voluntarily set for ourselves.

Let us refer to ourselves as subject S, who carries within his actual existence the corresponding potential to be realized. By ideally reproducing his own necessity, as well as that of A, S objectively knows that, by realizing potential a, he can satisfy his need to reproduce himself. However, S also objectively knows that, in order to effectively appropriate the product of this realization, he must first produce the actual existence of A, actually transforming B into it. Therefore, S must effectively develop his own potential s, the realization of which becomes the form taken by the realization of potential b, through which B becomes A. Now, as the agent of this transformation, S has transformed himself into S'.

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[54]Marx, Karl [1867] 1973, Capital, Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, p. 303, np . 4.

Consequently, he must renew the objective knowledge of his subjectivity by recognizing himself as the bearer of potential s', whose realization upon A is itself the effective realization of potential a. Following this course, S' has reproduced himself as S.

In other words, the subject of an action organized through this type of knowledge discovers that, in order to govern their own potentiality in relation to that of their object, they need to ideally accompany both the development of the object's necessity and the development of their own necessity. Moreover, this process cannot end until it reaches the point where each necessity is recognized, respectively, in its determination as a potentiality of the object whose necessary concrete form of realization is none other than the realization of the transformative power of the subject's action in pursuit of their own end. This is a dialectical process of knowledge that takes shape by reproducing in thought the movement unfolding in reality through the development of the subject's own necessity in relation to that of their object.

Let us consider two very basic examples of how the subject's recognition of the realization of their own potential as the necessary concrete form through which the object's potential is realized allows them to act upon the object to satisfy their own necessity. First, consider a plant that lacks water but still has the potential to survive. A person for whom the plant has use value decides to water it, taking it as the object of their action. Now consider a piece of iron whose materiality includes the potential to melt at a specific temperature. Someone who needs to shape the iron takes the piece as the object of their action by deciding to place it in a furnace heated to that temperature. In both cases, the realization of the subject's potential is the necessary concrete form in which the potential inherent in their object is realized, whether that object is a living being in itself or an inanimate thing. And, as these subjects organized their actions, their consciousness recognized the potential of their actions as the necessary concrete way to realize the potential of the object, whether they were aware of it or not.

Up to this point, we have traced necessity along its path of self-affirmation through its own negation as a simple power inherent in a concrete real form, whose realization transforms this form into a new concrete real form without any further mediation. However, this simple necessity affirms itself through its own negation. Necessity becomes a multiplicity of powers to be realized, inherent in a concrete real form, but mutually incompatible as they are already realized in the same concrete form engendered by the first. That is, the realization of one power by determining a concrete form implies the impossibility of any other power coexisting with it being realized by determining that same concrete form. Thus, necessity develops its concrete form of possibility, determining the original form as a genus, and the multiple, qualitatively different forms through which its various powers are realized are determined as the species of that genus. In turn, necessity continues its development, as possibility takes its own concrete form as a possibility that mediates the realization of possibility itself.

When, in ideally reproducing the determinations of our subjectivity and those of the object, we recognize that each carries within itself a real potential in the form of a possibility whose realization depends on the immediate action of the subject, the reproduction of the concrete in thought has completed its objective course. Of course, since it involves the realization of a possible necessity, but not a simple one, such objectivity does not imply that the subject's purpose takes precedence over other equally objective possibilities, whether or not they have been taken into account in organizing the action.

In summary, since representation imposes on real objects an external constructive necessity, which then determines its own nature, it must first design and construct the structure of ideal relations that form its logic. This first step thus presents itself as an independent process of objective knowledge, capable of generating its own object—that is, the core of the method of logical representation. In a second step, logic is applied to concrete real forms, deprived of their own necessity, in order to represent them by placing them in logical relations. The naturalization of logical representation produces the appearance that any scientific method must have its own corpus, independent of its practical application.

In contrast, dialectical reproduction begins by recognizing itself as the moment of action in which that very action is organized. Therefore, instead of having its own structure to construct, it can only develop by following the inherent movement of a concrete, real object. It begins by analyzing this object in search of its simplest necessity. It then follows this necessity through the concrete forms it takes as it is realized and surpasses its previous realization. It thus progresses to the point where it recognizes the original concrete, real object in its determinations, having reproduced it through thought.[55]

5.4. Original individual knowledge as a process of recognition from a social point of view

Let us now focus on the dialectical process of individual knowledge confronted with an object whose reproduction through thought has already been developed in relation to prior experience or is available as a product of social knowledge. In either case, pre-existing knowledge cannot be taken for granted with respect to the present object. To do so would cause knowledge of the present object to cease being an ideal reproduction of its determinations. It would become an external representation of current determinations based on the assumption that they correspond to those previously known. Given its very form as an ideal reproduction, every dialectical process of knowledge needs to analyze for itself the concrete reality it confronts in order to then ideally reproduce its determinations, as the mode by which the subject organizes its action.

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[55]Conscious knowledge and its object are both concrete material forms , and therefore both concrete forms of self-affirmation through self-negation. But they are transformed into abstractions as soon as the reproduction of the former in thought is reversed under the guise of having arisen from an a priori homology between the concrete determinations of the process of knowledge and those of its object.

Thus, resorting to existing dialectical knowledge only gives the subject the possibility of confronting the concrete reality upon which they will act with a guide regarding the necessity they must seek in the object in question. What was an intricate search with no other guide than their own wandering in the purely original process of knowledge becomes the possibility of directly inquiring whether the already known necessity is at play in the process of recognition. However, it is only a guide. Once the process of recognition discovers in its singular concrete reality a necessity different from that indicated by previously existing knowledge, or discovers a necessity that transcends it, it then becomes a purely original process of knowledge. Consequently, each individual reproduction of dialectical knowledge inevitably subjects existing social knowledge to critique, thus making it account for the continuity of its validity.

In fact, Marx places our process of recognition before the necessity to critically confront the specificity of the dialectical method from the very starting point of any scientific knowledge, by stating that:

> … I don't start from "concepts", … Where I start is from the simplest social form in which the product of labor takes shape in today's society, which is the "commodity".[56]

Since the starting point of this knowledge is a concrete existence and not its concept, the necessity that guides its unfolding cannot be external to that same concrete existence. Thus, Marx challenges our process of recognition to critically account for why we seek this determination within our object, even when that object is the method of knowledge itself, by stating that:

> Logic is the money of the spirit… it is alienated thought that therefore abstracts from nature and real man; abstract thought.[57]

Without a concept as a starting point or a logical necessity that abstracts real objects and ideally places them in external relation to each other, Marx makes it unavoidable for our process of critical recognition to answer for himself why, due to this peculiarity, the dialectical method is necessarily *the opposite of the development of a conceptual system* , however dialectical it may be:

> …it will be necessary to correct the idealistic way of presenting it, which gives the impression of dealing with purely conceptual definitions and the dialectic of these concepts. Therefore,

[56]Marx, Karl [1879-1880] 1982, Marginal Notes to "Adolph Wagner's Treatise on Political Economy", Mexico City: Ediciones Pasado y Presente, p. 48.
[57]Marx, Karl [1844] 1968, Manuscripts…, op . cit., p. 187.

> the following statement must be criticized above all: the product (or activity) becomes a commodity; the commodity, exchange value; exchange value, money.[58]

Similarly, Marx challenges our process of recognition by urging us to critically answer why *it is not a matter of opposing an abstract dialectical development to doctrinal theoretical conceptions* , by saying:

> Just as the group arises from the dialectical movement of simple categories, so too the series arises from the dialectical movement of groups, and the entire system arises from the dialectical movement of series. Apply this method to the categories of political economy and you will have the logic and metaphysics of political economy, [...] which give the impression that they have just sprung from a head full of pure reason.[59]

Finally, Marx takes our process of recognition to the necessity to critically account for the dialectical method in its unity as the *reproduction of the concrete by thought, in contrast to logical representation and its conceptual systems* , by referring to that unity in the following way:

> In the first path [analysis], the full representation was condensed to abstract determination; in the second, abstract determinations lead to the reproduction of the concrete through the path of thought.[60]

By proceeding in this way, we recognize Capital as the original intellectual expression of the necessity inherent in the historical raison d'être of the capitalist mode of production and, consequently, of the working class's role as the bearer of its revolutionary overcoming. In doing so, we recognize Capital as the original development of the form that the political consciousness of the working class needs to take in order to realize its determination as a revolutionary subject. And, as a specific step in the political action of producing this revolutionary consciousness, Marx gave his original knowledge an objective social form that allows others to make it their own by reproducing it themselves—namely, the form of a published text.

After Capital, all reproduction in thought that moves along the lines of the determinations developed within it is thus determined as a process of recognition from a social point of view. But it is not a matter of interpreting Capital. It is a matter of confronting capital in its real movement, of discovering its determinations by reproducing them through thought, thereby apprehending our concrete potential as political subjects in the organizational process of our action. We advance in this direction armed with the power that

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[58]Marx, Karl [1857-58] 1972, Fundamental Elements..., op . cit., p. 77

[59]Marx, Karl [1847] 1973, "The Poverty of Philosophy", Marx/Engels Selected Works, Volume 7, Buenos Aires: Editorial Ciencias del Hombre, p. 73.

[60]Marx, Karl [1857-58] 1972, Fundamental Elements..., op . cit., p. 21.

our process of knowledge acquires as a process of recognition, since it guides itself by critically following Marx's original path. In this sense, we have a twofold advantage over Marx. First, we have the product of Marx's social labor to empower our progress toward the free organization of the human life process. Second, we confront the immediate object of our action, capital, in historical forms far more developed than those Marx faced in his time. Concrete forms that then existed as barely emerging potentialities now present themselves to us in their full development. All of this marks our responsibility as historical subjects, whose action to overcome the capitalist mode of production implies, as an inherent and necessary moment, the collective production of a consciousness capable of organizing our own action with the objective power of dialectical knowledge.

If, during the process of reproducing a concrete reality through the thought upon which we are acting, we find forms that differ from those previously discovered by other subjects in their own investigations, our reproduction will no longer be a process of social recognition, but a process of original knowledge. In this context, let us consider the specific case of a divergence from the forms discovered by Marx himself. At this point, it should be clear that we do not intend to govern our actions as agents of social life by resorting to one or another interpretation of Marx. Therefore, when it comes to acting based on an objective knowledge of our own determinations, with the potential to transcend the appearances inherent in interpretations, we will not undertake an ideal representation of the concrete reality.

Logical representation, in keeping with its interpretive nature, leaves room for inversion. The difference between what someone asserts on their own and the writings of Marx, even if it openly contradicts the latter, can be resolved by maintaining that the assertion should be interpreted as "what Marx really meant." Based on this interpretation, a certain course of political action for the working class is proposed without clarifying that it is based on the proponent's own construction. Instead, this construction is presented as if it had arisen within the realm of theoretical knowledge under the auspices of the real Marx—that is, as Marxist theory or simply Marxism.[61]

In contrast, the reproduction of the concrete through thought by one person cannot claim to speak on behalf of another, even if the concrete forms it has taken in its development are identical to those already presented by that other person. Needless to say, the same applies to non-identical forms. Therefore, instead of speculating on hermeneutical or philological readings of Capital, we could summarize the issue by stating that "what Marx

[61]Particularly noteworthy examples of this practice are the reduction of value to its content by Ricardian Marxism and the reduction of value to its form by Rubinist Marxism . Both reductions result in the representation of human freedom as a natural attribute and not as a historical social relation that arises with the production of commodities as a necessary form of consciousness alienated within them. These reductions form the basis for the inversion of the critique of political economy into Marxist political economy precisely because the naturalization of the abstractly free individual is inherent to political economy (See Iñigo Carrera, Juan 2007, Understanding Capital Today..., op . cit., pp. 107-187).

encountered in his development was Marx's problem; what we find in the real concrete we face, whether or not it is the same as what Marx encountered, that is our problem."[62]

5.5. The mathematical method as a specific form of the dialectical method

Far from any teleological abstraction, the reason for the continuous movement of matter can only be scientifically grasped by starting with necessity in its simplest and most general form: that of affirming itself through its own negation. Up to this point, we have followed the movement of this necessity through which it realizes itself by negating this realization, regenerating itself along the qualitative determination of its concrete forms. Now, we must follow this same necessity in its development in the form of an affirmation that negates its own negation. Thus, simple qualitative necessity negates itself in order to affirm itself as quantitative necessity. To organize our action with full awareness of its necessity, we need to objectively know the measure of our quantitative determinations, as well as those of our object. However, given its concrete quality as an affirmation that negates its own negation, quantitative necessity always presents itself as a reality that lacks any potential for realization. Therefore, the very quality of quantitative determinations excludes the possibility of following their movement in order to reproduce them through thought. Specifically, the apprehension of real quantitative determinations through thought requires recourse to an external constructive necessity. Only with regard to mathematical knowledge does dialectical knowledge need to take the form of a logical representation. However, this logic is neither formal nor dialectical, but rather represents exclusively quantitative necessity. Therefore, since it excludes the reduction of qualitative determinations to the appearance of immediate assertions, it leaves no opening for ideology .[63]

Since the reproduction of the concrete in thought follows the development of the general form of necessity, while the logical representation of quantitative relations takes as its object a specific form of that generic necessity, the former governs the integrity of the dialectical knowledge process.

5.6. The reproduction of real determinations through thought as a historically specific form of social relation

As we have noted previously, the dialectical method of reproducing real concrete forms through thought lacks an external structure of logical necessity. Therefore, we can only unfold it by resorting to a concrete real form as its object. In relation to the dialectical method itself, Marx's reproduction, through thought, of the concrete determination of the

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[62]Iñigo Carrera, Juan 2007, Knowing capital today..., op . cit., p. 8.

[63]See Iñigo Carrera, Juan 2008, Capital: Historical Reason, Revolutionary Subject and Conscience, op . cit., pp. 287-294.

revolutionary subjectivity of the working class in Capital is the only real form we can use to explore how this method unfolds. It is no coincidence that the first chapter of Capital unfolds the simplest specific determination of this subjectivity. At that point, it only appears in the form of a free personality alienated in the product of its own privately performed social labor, a product that confronts its producers in the form of its objectified social relation.

The power of a method that transcends the distortion of objectivity caused by the introduction of an external constructive necessity concerns scientific knowledge as a whole, regardless of its specific object. However, the generalization of a method that reproduces concrete real forms through thought would immediately reveal that, under capital, personal freedom is the form that alienation takes. Far from this evidence, the accumulation of capital imposes the ideological naturalization of personal freedom and the universality of the fetishistic consciousness inherent in the private organization of social labor, at the expense of its capacity to develop the productive forces of society.

In contrast, from the perspective of the working class as a historical subject, the ability to objectively recognize its own alienation implies a fundamental step towards its emancipation:

> Freedom of will, therefore, is nothing other than the capacity to decide with full knowledge of the facts. It follows, then, that the freer a person's judgment is on a given matter, the greater the necessity that determines the content, the subject matter of that judgment; while the uncertainty arising from ignorance, the insecurity that seems to result from an arbitrary choice among a large number of possible, diverse, and contradictory decisions, proves in itself that it is not free, that it is dominated by the very object it should dominate.[64]

To begin with, this objective recognition liberates the consciousness of the working class from the illusory abstraction of recovering an ahistorical, and therefore pseudo-natural, freedom lost to capital. Moreover, revealing alienation as the content of freedom opens the way to a historically specific form of freedom. We could say that this is a freedom engendered by the negation of the negation of a seemingly natural freedom through alienation. Therefore, it is not a consciousness abstractly liberated from alienation, but rather a consciousness liberated from fetishism, since it objectively recognizes in its freedom the form that its alienation takes under capital.

> ...from a social standpoint, the working class, even outside the direct process of labor, is an attribute of capital, no more and no less than inanimate instruments. Even its individual consumption is [...] a mere factor in the process of capital reproduction. ... In reality, the worker belongs to capital before selling himself to the capitalist.[65]

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[64]Engels, Friedrich [1878] 1957, Anti-Dühring, Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridad, p. 123.
[65]Marx, Karl [1867] 1973, Capital, op . cit., pp. 482 and 486.

Being a living appendage of capital encompasses the working class itself. Therefore, recognizing this fact is not only a matter of workers' personal subjectivity but is key to the political organization of the working class. Only by objectively recognizing its determination as an attribute subsumed by capital can the working class recognize itself as the concrete embodiment of the necessary development of capital's essential contradiction: that of reproducing itself through the unstoppable socialization of private labor. Throughout this process, capital increasingly deprives the capitalist class of the capacity to actively embody the private organization of social labor, assigning this role to a specialized wage-labor force. Thus, capital tends to place the entire production process in the hands and minds of the working class it subsumes.

As a historically specific form taken by the development of society's productive forces, capital cannot avoid carrying its essential contradiction beyond its own terms. Thus, the capitalist mode of production carries within it the necessity of self-annihilation, transforming the organization of social labor and, consequently, social consumption, into a directly socialized process. The determination of the working class as an attribute of capital, personifying the development of the latter's essential contradiction, is the source of the working class's political power. Moreover, this determination makes the working class a historically specific revolutionary subject.

Therefore, the working class needs the dialectical method of reproducing concrete reality through thought in order to organize its political action and overcome the capitalist mode of production. In turn, this dialectical method can only originate and develop as a specific, concrete form adopted by this political action.

Neither a formal logic that conceives of “freedom” and “alienation” as mutually incompatible identities, nor a materialist or systematic dialectical logic that places these identities in an external contradictory unity, can recognize, not only in personal freedom the form that alienation takes, but in alienation the form that – brutally at the expense of the working class itself – takes as the path to human emancipation:

> Relationships of personal dependence [...] are the first social forms in which human productivity develops only within a restricted sphere and in isolated places. Personal independence based on dependence on things is the second important form in which a system of general social metabolism is constituted—a system of universal relationships, universal needs, and universal capacities. Free individuality, founded on the universal development of individuals and on the subordination of their collective, social productivity as a social patrimony, constitutes the third stage. The second creates the conditions for the third.[66]

[66]Marx, Karl [1857-58] 1972, Fundamental Elements..., op . cit., p. 85.

6. Conclusion

Let us review the path we have followed thus far. We began by confronting, as an immediate and concrete issue, the question of the production of the political consciousness of the working class as a revolutionary subject, which carries within it the necessity for our current social relation, capital, to transcend itself by becoming a society of freely related individuals, who are such by virtue of objectively recognizing themselves as necessary organs of their collective life process. We started our analysis by focusing on the absolutely dominant form that the attempt at such production takes today: Marxism. This analysis specifically pointed to the objectivity of Marxism's method of knowledge, thus revealing its appeal to subjective interpretation and its agreement regarding an inevitable externality between knowledge and action. Consequently, we faced the necessity to develop the determination of knowledge as action in the process of self-governance. Once we recognized knowledge as determined in this way, the widespread acceptance of its conception as external to action led us to seek the origin of this conception in the very form that the process of knowledge that engenders it takes. To this end, we follow the method of logical representation—whether based on formal logic, dialectical materialism, or systematic dialectics—throughout its development. We begin with the scientific role of its formal objectivity and proceed to its ideological rejection of objective knowledge, both stemming from the externality of its constructive necessity. The subjective arbitrariness of interpretations—Marxist or otherwise—and the externality of the constructive necessity of logical representations—whatever the form of their logic—with respect to the intrinsic necessity of real, concrete determinations undermine the objectivity of both forms of knowledge. Consequently, both lack the objectivity that the working class needs to recognize its concrete determination as a subject capable of overcoming the capitalist mode of production and, therefore, organizing its political action accordingly.

From there, we move forward by focusing on the specific forms that analysis and synthesis must take as integral moments of a dialectical method that reproduces through thought the concrete real determinations of the subject of action in its relation to those of its object.

We begin by confronting our object—that is, the form that the objective consciousness of the working class must take as a revolutionary subject—as an immediately given concrete entity. Then, through our process of knowledge, we manage to recognize it as a concrete entity whose determinations we know, having reproduced them in thought.

Next, we develop the reason why, in order to appropriate this ideal reproduction, third parties must critically advance on their own along the original path taken to achieve it, thus determining what is a process of recognition from a social point of view as their original individual process of knowledge. In our present case, by critically recognizing the original development of the dialectical method of reproducing the concrete through thought in

Marx's Capital, we take this same method as the concrete object whose unfolding must be reproduced in order to ideally appropriate its determinations.

By advancing along this methodological path opened by Marx, we recognize ourselves as members of the working class and, as such, as bearers of its generic determination as a revolutionary subject. As personally free individuals, we need to realize this generic determination by giving it the concrete form of political action. Since we have already ideally reproduced the concrete determinations of our personal freedom, we do not organize our political action by falling into the illusion that being a free person is a natural condition that the oppression imposed by capital alienates. Instead, we organize our political action aimed at overcoming the capitalist mode of production, objectively aware that it must inherently entail progress toward the socialization of private labor. That is, it is a political action that, however limited its scope may seem in a given case, inherently carries within it the development of the absolute contradiction inherent in capital and, therefore, carries within it progress toward its overcoming.[67]

Therefore, advancing the production of general development and the corresponding universalization of the dialectical method as an inherent form of the consciousness of the working class as a historical subject is itself a specific, concrete form of the political action of the working class. The production and universalization of this form of consciousness cannot wait for the overcoming of the capitalist mode of production. On the contrary, they are necessary conditions for this overcoming.[68]

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[67]To illustrate this point, let us recall the ten foundational proposals for the political action of the working class presented in the Communist Manifesto (Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich [1848] 1973, op . cit., p. 109). Analyzing each of these, the socialization of private labor becomes visible as their generic content.

[68] As a point of perspective, let us consider a specific characteristic inherent in the phase of capital accumulation that is unfolding with the universalization of robotic machinery governed by artificial intelligence. The development of this universalization gives the socialization of private labor the concrete form of a contradiction historically inherent in capital accumulation, which now acquires a specific sharpness. The explosive increase in the productivity of labor operating such machinery leads to an increase in the rate of surplus value. But, at the same time, the substitution of living labor by machinery gives rise to an increase in the organic composition of capital. And the potential of the machinery in question determines this increase in a specific way: it is not simply a relative decrease in variable capital compared to constant capital, but rather a sustained absolute decrease in the living labor put into action. With the base of surplus-value production shrinking and constant capital multiplying, the rate of profit will be strangled, however much the rate of surplus value increases. And with it, the capacity of capital to reproduce its accumulation.

In turn, the technical basis founded on the multiplication of the capacity of mechanized logical representation to operate materially on nature by computing its measurement relationships with ever-increasing precision, while remaining powerless to account for the qualitative determinations of those measurements, exhausts its power as it advances toward this, its own limit. And the same occurs with the capacity to develop the organization of the process of social metabolism sustained on that same methodological basis which reduces the quality of its objects to their measurement relationships.

This opens the possibility that this double constriction of its capacity to valorize itself will generate, as a necessity for capital itself, the development of a living labor force capable of moving beyond the scope of logical representation, both with respect to natural forms and to the organization of the unity between production and social consumption, by reproducing concrete reality through thought. But this labor force can only be the product of the political action of the working class, which aims directly at overcoming the

A personal note to conclude. Based on my original work on the issue summarized in this article,[69] Luis Denari and I founded the CICP with a specific political purpose: to participate in the process through which other members of the working class develop their consciousness by appropriating their own determinations as historical subjects, and by reproducing these determinations through thought.

capitalist mode of production: the development of its specific productive attribute necessarily takes shape through the objective recognition of its own alienation and, consequently, through the liberation of consciousness from the fetishism of capital.

This phase would be the last gasp of the capitalist mode of production on the way to its overcoming through the immediate socialization of labor and the means of production.

[69]Iñigo Carrera, Juan 1992, Dialectical knowledge. The regulation of action in its form of reproduction of one's own necessity through thought, Buenos Aires: CICP.